In this paper, we study score procurement auctions with all-pay quality bids. A supplier's score is the di¤erence between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the highest score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The procurer's payo¤ is the di¤erence between the winner's quality and the procurer's payments to the suppliers. Equilibrium quality and price bids are solved without …rst obtaining the corresponding equilibrium scores. We …nd that quality bids, the suppliers'payo¤s and the procurer's payo¤ do not depend on whether price bids are made contingent on quality bids. Compared to a benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which the losing suppliers' quality bidding costs are reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision and suppliers'payo¤s, but they tend to increase the total surplus and the procurer's payo¤. JEL Classi…cation Numbers: C70, D44, D89, L12, O32.
Introduction
Procurement is widely adopted to acquire goods, services, or work. On average, about 15% of yearly global domestic product is spent on public procurement alone, including military acquisitions. 1 Procurements involving multi-dimensional bids are ubiquitous. Typically, suppliers are required to bid on both quality and price, which jointly form single-dimensional scores that are used by the procurer to determine the winner, whose o¤er turns out to be the most economically advantageous.
Since the seminal work of Che [7] , score auctions with winner-pay quality bids have been studied in the literature in many contexts, including Branco [6] , Asker and Cantillon [1, 2] , Bajari, Houghton and Tadelis [3] , Wang and Liu [14] , Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka [9] and Nishimura [12] . In this literature, the central idea in identifying equilibrium bidding strategies is to transform the multi-dimensional bidding problem into a single-dimensional problem of bidding on score. This idea is based on the insightful observation that a supplier should choose quality and price bids optimally to maximize his payo¤ conditional on winning with any score s. The optimal quality and price choice for any score s would allow the de…nition of a value function for each supplier, which only depends on own type and the score bid s. With this value function, the original problem with multi-dimensional bids is transformed into a standard single-dimensional problem with a score bid. 2 In many situations, the quality bids are more realistically interpreted as an all-pay component (at least partially) rather than a winner-pay component. 3 For example, all-pay quality bids are often features of procurements in defense contracting and other military design competitions, architectural designs, government construction projects with a design component, and business to business customized sales. To the best of our knowledge, Che and Gale [8] are the …rst to study score procurement with all-pay quality bids in a complete information environment. Their focus is to demonstrate the optimality of shortlisting and handicapping in such environments.
Our study is the …rst to introduce all-pay quality bids in score procurement auctions with incomplete information. We provide an alternative procedure to identify the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with scores monotonic in types, if such an equilibrium exists. The procedure applies to both cases of all-pay and winner-pay quality bids. 4 The merit of our alternative procedure lies in that we directly identify the quality bid and price bid without relying on an intermediate step of solving for the score bid. This procedure is made possible because of another observation on the relationship between equilibrium price and quality bids in score auctions, which has not been utilized so far in the literature: We can view the pair of equilibrium 1 See "Supplement to the 2013 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement: Procurement and Innovation," https://www.unsystem.org/content/supplement-2013-annual-statistical-report-united-nations-procurement (accessed Jan. 15, 2019). 2 For a recent general treatment of winner-pay quality-bid score auctions, please refer to Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka [9] for details. 3 See Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [4] and Kaplan, Luski, Sela and Wettstein [10] among many others. 4 Our procedure also applies to intermediate cases in Siegel [13] . quality and price bids as an incentive compatible direct mechanism, with the quality bid being the allocation rule and the price bid the payment rule. Then, as well understood from Myerson [11] , the price bidding function can be fully pinned down as a function of the quality bidding function. This observation together with the well utilized insight that a supplier chooses quality and price bids optimally to maximize his payo¤ conditional on bidding the equilibrium score, would allow us to obtain a condition on the equilibrium quality bidding function which, together with the appropriate boundary condition, identi…es that function. It thus follows that we can further identify the equilibrium price bidding function based on the above mentioned relationship.
The equilibrium analysis enables us to study the e¤ect of all-pay quality bids in score procurement auctions on quality provision, supplier payo¤s, procurer payo¤s and total surplus by comparing our environment to two benchmarks with winner-pay quality bids. In Benchmark I, we have a hypothetical scenario in which placing a quality bid does not incur sunk cost. In Benchmark II, we assume the losing suppliers'sunk costs incurred in placing their quality bids are reimbursed by the procurer. Our setting thus resembles those of Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [5] and Siegel [13] who study equilibria in auctions with contingent investment. 5 Speci…cally, we adopt a two-supplier environment, in which a supplier's score is the di¤erence between his quality and price bids. The supplier with the higher score wins and gets paid his own price bid. The procurer's payo¤ equals the di¤erence between the winner's quality and her payments to the suppliers. We …nd that compared to the benchmark II environment of winner-pay quality bids, in which the losing supplier's cost of quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision and the suppliers' payo¤s, but they tend to increase the total surplus and procurer's payo¤. Compared to the hypothetical benchmark I, in which placing a quality bid does not incur sunk cost, all pay quality bids tend to reduce quality provision, the suppliers' payo¤s and total surplus, although they can either increase or decrease the procurer's payo¤. Consequently, although it is reasonable to view the credible assurance of a given quality level in many procurement contexts as requiring an upfront sunk investment that is all-pay in nature, our approach suggests an additional reason for adopting all-pay quality bids in score procurement auctions: the practice may increase the procurer's payo¤.
Moreover, we …nd that quality bids, supplier payo¤s and the procurer's payo¤ do not depend on whether quality bids are placed and publicly revealed before the price bids are made. Our result shows that when quality and price must be placed in sequence, whether or not information on quality bids is revealed does not a¤ect procurement performance.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with all-pay quality bids. Section 3 provides a procedure for equilibrium analysis, which applies to both all-pay and winner-pay quality bids, as well as to a continuum of intermediate cases. Section 4 examines an environment in which quality bids are placed and publicly revealed before price bids are made. Section 5 compares all-pay and winner-pay quality bids on quality provision, supplier payo¤s, the procurer's payo¤ and total surplus. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks. Technical proofs are relegated to the appendices.
Model
We consider a score procurement auction with a risk neutral procurer and two risk neutral suppliers. The two suppliers, i = 1; 2, simultaneously choose their nonnegative bids of quality q i and price p i to compete for a contract. Only the winner will collect his price bid p, while the quality bid q is an all pay component paid by each bidder. Bidder i must incur a total cost of C i (q) = c i &(q) to bid a quality q whether he wins the contract or not. Here, we assume the function &( ) is continuous on
and & 00 (q) > 0; 8q 0. 6 For example, the class of functions &(q) = q ; > 1 satis…es these conditions. c i is supplier i's private type, with high c i leading to high marginal e¤ort cost. We assume that the c i are independently and identically distributed following cumulative distribution F ( ) on [c; c] with a positive density f ( ). We assume 0 < c < c < +1:
The higher score wins and the score function is de…ned as
The procurer's payo¤ is the di¤erence between the q and p of the winning bidder. Supplier i's payo¤ is
Equilibrium analysis
We now derive the unique equilibrium within the class of symmetric pure strategy equilibria with scores decreasing in type. There are two key observations that facilitate identifying the equilibrium. Suppose the score of type c i is s(c i ) in the equilibrium. First, if we view the equilibrium strategy (q(c i ); p(c i )) as an incentive compatible direct mechanism, then the Myerson [11] approach, together with a zero payo¤ condition for type c, would allow us to pin down a payment rule p(c i ; q( )) for any given allocation rule q( ) decreasing in type. Second, de…ne the score by s(c i ) = q(c i ) p(c i ; q( )); 8c i . Note s( ) is solely determined by the allocation rule q( ). Given supplier i with type c i bids this score s(c i ) in equilibrium, supplier i would choose a pair (q; p) = (q(c i ); p(c i )) when maximizing his expected payo¤. This further gives us conditions on the equilibrium bidding functions (q( ); p( )). The restrictions on (q( ); p( )), which are implied by the above two observations, together with the boundary condition q( c) = 0, pins down a candidate equilibrium allocation rule q( ). If this q( ) is decreasing in type, and the corresponding s( ) is also decreasing in type, then the identi…ed (q( ); p( )) is the symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, there exists no equilibrium within the class.
We will demonstrate that the above two observations allow us to derive the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with scores decreasing in type, 7 when such an equilibrium exists, and to determine when no such equilibrium exists. To accommodate both cases of an all-pay quality bid and a winner-pay quality bid, following Baye, Kovenock and de Vries [5] and Siegel [13] , we introduce a parameter 2 f0; 1g
in the following analysis, where represents the fraction of the quality bid that is all-pay. 8 Hence, = 1 stands for an all-pay quality bid, which is the main focus of this paper; and = 0 stands for the hypothetical benchmark scenario of a winner-pay quality bid, in which a losing supplier does not incur a cost to place his quality bid (Benchmark I). The other benchmark scenario of winner-pay quality bid we are going to study is the case, in which we have = 1 but the losing supplier's cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer (Benchmark II). Note that the suppliers'payo¤ functions are identical in these two benchmark environments, thus their equilibrium bidding strategies must be the same. Because of the transfers from the procurer to the losing suppliers, the procurer's payo¤ must be lower in Benchmark II.
Implications of the …rst observation (Myerson incentive compatibility)
We …rst consider the implications of the …rst observation. Fix any q(c i ). We can view any equilibrium strategy (q(c i ); p(c i )) as an incentive compatible direct mechanism that leads to decreasing scores in type.
The quality bid function q(c i ) can be viewed as an allocation rule, and the price function p(c i ) can be viewed as a payment rule. Then the Myerson approach allows us to pin down the payment rule p(c i ) as a function of the allocation rule q( ). The following provides the details.
Given a (q(c i ); p(c i )) pair that leads to scores that are decreasing in type, consider a type c i supplier's problem of choosing ac i to maximize his expected payo¤ when the other supplier is truthful:
If (q( ); p( )) is a pure strategy equilibrium, thenc i ; the solution to (2), satis…esc i = c i , 8c i . In other words, the following incentive compatibility (IC) condition holds: 7 The identi…ed equilibrium score, quality and price bids are all di¤erentiable in type. 8 The equilibrium analysis in this section applies to an environment with a general number of suppliers, 2 [0; 1] and score function s = q p, ; > 0.
If q 0 (c i ) < 0; the single crossing condition holds:
which means such q(c i ) can be supported by the pricing rule that will be identi…ed below.
The IC condition (3), together with the envelope theorem, thus leads to
Note that in equilibrium with scores monotonic in type, regardless of the value of , we must have i ( c; c) = 0. In equilibrium, the least e¢ cient type c never wins and never incurs a cost of quality. 9 Using the envelope condition (4), we have
By the de…nition of i (c i ; c i ) in (2), we further have
which leads to price rule
Implications of the second observation (optimal bids for a given score)
We now turn to the implication of the second observation. Suppose (q(c i ); p(c i )) is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. By implication of the …rst observation, we must have that (6) holds. De…ne
The second observation says that any equilibrium (q(c i ); p(c i )) must solve the following optimization problem:
(q(c i ); p(c i )) = arg max
s:t: : s = q p = s(c i ): 9 Note q( c) = 0 for = 1.
The corresponding Lagrangian for the above problem is
The …rst order conditions are as follows:
We thus have
We can thus pin down the candidate equilibrium quality
Note that the quality bid q(c i ) is identi…ed by only using the second observation. This is the case for the di¤erence-form score function that we consider, but it is not the case in general. Please refer to Appendix B for the procedure for identifying q(c i ) without solving for the equilibrium score bidding function for a general score function. In particular, the case of a ratio score function is studied there as an example.
Clearly, for an all-pay quality bid with = 1, we have q( c) = (& 0 ) 1 (0) = 0. 10 For a winner-pay quality
Since q(c i ) is decreasing, the above characterized (q( ); p( )) would constitute a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium within the class we consider if and only if the corresponding score function s(
is decreasing in type. This is indeed the case as veri…ed by the following lemma, whose proof is relegated to appendix A.
We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The symmetric bidding strategy (q( ); p( )) identi…ed in (9) and (6) constitutes the unique symmetric pure strategy equilibrium with scores decreasing in types. Moreover, q( ) is decreasing in type.
The way we establish the equilibrium implies that the following two remarks are straightforward.
Remark 1
The equilibrium analysis of this section applies to 2 [0; 1].
Remark 2 Our equilibrium characterization requires & 0 (0) = 0, which says marginal cost must be zero when quality is zero. Che and Gale [8] also require the same condition in their equilibrium analysis in a complete information score auction setting. If & 0 (0) > 0, the equilibrium involves pooling. For example, consider = 1.
De…ne the cuto¤ĉ by
In equilibrium, all types in [ĉ; c] place the same bid as type c. 11 We have the following two additional remarks on applying our procedure to a more general environment. then the equilibrium for the case of all-pay quality bids is identi…ed as
Remark 4 Following the insights of Hanazono, Nakabayashi and Tsuruoka [9] , there is an alternative approach, which instead requires identifying an equilibrium score function as an intermediate step before decomposing it into quality and price bids. The details are as fellows. 13 Assume a general score rule of s(q; p) and N 2 suppliers. From the second observation, if s(c i ) is the equilibrium score, we can solve for
Then consider supplier i's optimization problem
1 1 This is implied by (9). 1 2 The equilibrium analysis in the application applies to a score function of s = s(q; p) = q p with , > 0. 1 3 Our approach avoids this additional intermediate step of solving for the score bidding function, which could involve substantial calculations.
If s(c i ) is an equilibrium, then we must havec i = c i . This gives the following …rst order condition
Under the proper conditions, this equation would pin down a solution of s(c i ) with applicable boundary condition. If s(c i ) is decreasing in type, then the equilibrium is identi…ed as (q( ); p( )) = (q(c i js(c i )); p(c i js(c i ))).
The procedure proposed in this paper has the merit of saving the middle step of solving for the equilibrium score by …rst directly solving for the quality bid directly.
4 Equilibrium when quality bids are placed before price bids
In this section, we focus on the case of all-pay quality bids, i.e. = 1. Suppose now that the suppliers must …rst decide simultaneously which qualities to provide. The quality bids will then be observed by both suppliers before they simultaneously make the second stage price bids. We solve the game by backward induction.
We start from the second stage. Suppose the …rst round quality bids are q i ; i = 1; 2. Clearly, the second stage is a simultaneous move price setting subgame between the two suppliers. We use q (1) and q (2) to denote the higher and lower quality bids from the …rst stage. The supplier with higher quality q (1) would bid at a level p such that q (1) p = q (2) , and the supplier with lower quality q (2) would bid at a zero price. 14 
The
supplier with higher quality wins the procurement and earns a second stage surplus of p = q (1) q (2) .
We now derive the …rst stage quality bids. Assume a decreasing symmetric bidding strategy q( ). We apply the truthful direct mechanism approach. Assuming that the other supplier follows strategy q( ), the expected payo¤ of supplier i of type c i is as follows if he reports c 0 i :
The incentive compatibility condition requires
which coincides with (8) for = 1. Therefore, as was established in Section 3, q(c i ) is decreasing in type.
We thus have that the observability of quality bids when suppliers make their price bids does not change their quality choices.
Moreover, the total surplus, the procurer's expected payo¤ and each supplier's expected payo¤ are not a¤ected. It is clear that the total surplus is not a¤ected as this is completely determined by the suppliers' quality choices, since the total surplus is simply the di¤erence between the higher quality and total costs incurred.
The …rst stage IC condition, together with the envelope theorem, leads to
Note we still have~ i ( c; c) = 0 as the least e¢ cient type never wins and always incurs zero cost. We thus
which coincides with (5), which gives the suppliers' expected payo¤ conditional on type c i for the case of simultaneous quality and price bids. Since total surplus and the supplier's expected payo¤ conditional on type c i are the same across the two scenarios, the procurer's expected payo¤ must also be the same. We summarize these results in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Quality bids, supplier expected payo¤ conditional on type c i and procurer expected payo¤ (and thus expected total surplus) do not depend on whether quality bids are placed simultaneously with or before the price bids.
All-pay versus winner-pay quality bids
We now turn to the comparison between a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids and two benchmark environments of winner-pay quality bids. In the …rst benchmark scenario of winner-pay quality bids, we assume a hypothetical environment, in which the losing suppliers do not need to incur costs to place their quality bids. In the second benchmark scenario of winner-pay quality bids, we have both suppliers incur their costs of placing their quality bids but the losing supplier's cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer.
Comparison to the …rst benchmark: loser incurs no quality cost ( = 0)
We …rst compare a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids with the …rst benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which hypothetically the losing suppliers do not need to incur costs to place their quality bids.
We will establish that all-pay quality bids lead to lower quality provision in general, and for the class of cost functions &(q) = q ; > 1, lower total surplus and suppliers'payo¤s. Moreover, we will identify conditions under which the procurer derives higher and lower payo¤s from all-pay quality bids than winner-pay quality bids. In particular, we will show that when &(q) = q ; as converges to 1 from above, i.e. when the cost function &(q) gets close to being linear, winner-pay bids ( = 0) cannot be procurer payo¤ maximizing if the proportion can be arbitrarily chosen in [0; 1]:
First, by (9) , the equilibrium quality bid decreases in , which means that all-pay quality bids lead to lower quality provision.
Proposition 1 All-pay quality bids lead to lower quality provision than winner-pay quality bids.
From (4), we have
where from (9)
Therefore, we have
Since i ( c; c) = 0 in both scenarios, if we can show that j d i(ci;ci) dci j decreases with , then all-pay quality bids lead to lower supplier payo¤s than winner-pay quality bids. This is the case when ' = & [(& 0 ) 1 ] is convex as will be veri…ed in the proof of the following proposition. Clearly, &(q) = q ; > 1 satis…es this condition.
is convex, then all-pay quality bids lead to lower supplier payo¤ s than winner-pay quality bids.
We next turn to the total surplus and the procurer's payo¤. Total surplus is
The procurer's payo¤ equals the di¤erence between total surplus and the suppliers'payo¤s. A supplier's expected payo¤ is
Therefore, the procurer's payo¤ equals 15
In the following analysis, we consider &(q) = q ; > 1. With this speci…cation, we have the following results.
:
Lemma 2 immediately leads to the following results. 16
Proposition 3 If & = q ; > 1, all-pay quality bids lead to lower total surplus and suppliers' payo¤ s than winner-pay bids; and they lead to lower procurer payo¤ when (1 1 )
For example, we consider the class F (c) = (c 1) on [1; 2], > 0. For this class of type distributions, we have 1 5 This can be veri…ed as below:
: 1 6 The result on suppliers'payo¤s in Proposition 3 is consistent with that of Proposition 2.
(1
Since c 1 c < 1; the right hand side of the above equation is always positive when
We thus have the following corollary. 17 We next answer the question whether it is possible that all-pay quality bids lead to a higher procurer payo¤ than winner-pay quality bids, which would justify the adoption of score procurements with all-pay quality bids. The following analysis illustrates that this is in general possible.
All-pay quality bids can either bene…t or hurt the procurer 1 F (c) = (2 c) 2 . Note that 18
Numerical simulation reveals that all-pay quality bids lead to higher procurer payo¤ than winner-pay quality bids, i.e. p ( = 1) > p ( = 0), if and only if 2 (1; 1:18613), i.e. when the e¤ort cost function is not far from a linear function. In particular, when = 1:1, we have P ( = 0) = 8: 28 10 4 and P ( = 1) = 1: 52 10 3 .
All-pay quality bids lead to lower quality bids than winner-pay quality bids, which allows suppliers to lower their price bids. It is thus possible that the drop in price bids dominates the drop in quality bids, which makes it possible that all-pay quality bids lead to higher procurer payo¤.
Comparison to the second benchmark: loser' s sunk quality cost reimbursed by the procurer
We next compare a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids with the second benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which both suppliers incur their costs of placing their quality bids but the losing supplier's cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer.
Note that suppliers' payo¤ functions are identical in the …rst and second benchmark environments.
Therefore, we must have the following result.
Lemma 3
The equilibrium bidding strategy is the same across the two benchmark environments.
Based on Lemma 3 and the results of Section 5:1, we immediately have the following result. Note that equilibrium bidding strategies are the same across the two benchmark environments as shown by Lemma 3, and in the second benchmark, the loser also incurs a quality provision cost that the procurer covers. We thus have the following results.
Corollary 2
The suppliers' payo¤ s must be same across the two benchmark environments, and the total surplus and procurer's payo¤ must be lower in the second benchmark environment.
This means that a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids is more likely to render a higher procurer payo¤ when the second benchmark of winner-pay quality bids is adopted instead of the …rst benchmark.
In particular, in the examples provided in the end of Section 5:1, all-pay quality bids generate higher procurer payo¤s than winner-pay quality bids under the second benchmark, whenever they do under the …rst benchmark.
It remains to further investigate whether the second winner-pay benchmark can generate a higher procurer payo¤ than all-pay quality bids, and how the total surplus compares. We investigate these issues under the assumption that &(q) = q ; > 1. Note that under this speci…cation, we have that q(c; = 0) = ( c) 1 1 by (9) and thus &(q(c; = 0)) = ( c) 1 .
We …rst look at total surplus. In a procurement auction with all-pay quality bids, i.e. = 1, by Lemma 2, the total surplus is
Let c (1) denote the higher cost parameter of the suppliers. In the second benchmark of winner-pay quality bids, in which both suppliers incur their costs of placing their quality bids but the losing supplier's cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer, the total surplus is
We thus have T S R (1) T S(1)
We thus have T S R (1) T S(1) 0:
Recall that Proposition 5 says that all-pay quality bids lead to lower suppliers'payo¤s than the second benchmark scenario if &(q) = q ; > 1. This implies that the procurer must enjoy a higher payo¤ with all-pay quality bids than with winner-pay bids under the second benchmark.
We summarize the above results as follows.
Relative to the second benchmark environment where the losing supplier's cost of placing his quality bid is reimbursed by the procurer, all-pay quality bids generate higher total surplus and higher procurer payo¤ s.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study the impact of an all-pay quality component in score procurements. Our focus is on the equilibrium quality, supplier payo¤, procurer payo¤ and total surplus. We …nd that compared to benchmark environments with winner-pay quality bids, all-pay quality bids tend to lower the quality provision. However, all-pay quality bids may improve the procurer's payo¤. This …nding thus provides an additional justi…cation for a procurer's requirement that suppliers actually incur the cost of developing the product as part of their bid. Doing so not only guarantees that the procurer acquires exactly the quality that the winning supplier bids, but also may increase the procurer's payo¤.
Surprisingly, our study shows that when all-pay quality bids are placed and disclosed before price bids, the same quality bids, suppliers'payo¤s and procurer's payo¤ are generated as in the case of simultaneous quality and price bids. One implication of this …nding is that when price bids are simultaneously placed after simultaneous all-pay quality bids, a policy of revelation of the quality bid information before suppliers make their price bids does not alter equilibrium quality and expected payo¤s of the procurer and suppliers. 19 One methodological innovation in this paper lies in that we come up with a two-step procedure, which allows us to identify the quality and price bids directly if there exists a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium that renders scores decreasing in types. This procedure does not rely on solving for the equilibrium score function as a middle step. Our procedure also reveals if such an equilibrium does not exist.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
Note that from (6), we have
Note that from (8), we have ci[ +(1 )(1 F (ci))]
F (ci)
& 0 (q(c i )) = 1. We thus have
Note that from (6), we have c i (1 )&(q(c i )) p(c i ) < 0. We thus have s 0 (c i ) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall
Since i ( c; c) = 0 in both scenarios, if we can show that j d i(ci;ci) dci j decreases with , then we have that all-pay quality bids lead to lower supplier payo¤ than winner-pay quality bids.
We have x( ) > 0; x 0 ( ) < 0: Thus the monotonicity of j d i(ci;ci) dci j with respect to is equivalent to the monotonicity of 1 x '(x); x 0. Note '(0) = 0 and lim x!0
increases with x since its derivative is x' 00 (x) 0 and reaches zero when x = 0. We thus have [ 1 x '(x)] 0 0, i.e. j d i(ci;ci) dci j decreases with .
Proof of Lemma 2
By (9), we have
The expected total surplus is thus
Suppliers'expected surplus is
Therefore, we have the following procurer's expected payo¤
Proof of Proposition 4
We have
We thus have lim !1 + 0
Appendix B
In this section, we describe how to generalize our two-step procedure for identifying symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in an environment with N 2 suppliers and a general score function s(q; p) with s q (q; p) > 0,
Implication of the …rst observation
We treat equilibrium (q(c i ); p(c i )) as an incentive compatible general direct mechanism that generates scores decreasing in types, then the Myerson [11] approach allows us to write down payment rule p(c i ) as a function of the allocation rule q(c i ). The following is the details.
Given (q(c i ); p(c i )) that leads to scores that are decreasing in types, consider a type c i supplier i's problem of making an announcementc i to maximize his expected payo¤ when the other supplier is truthful:
If (q( ); p( )) is a pure strategy equilibrium, we would havec i = c i , i.e. the incentive compatibility (IC) condition:
The IC condition (12) , together with the envelope theorem, thus leads to
Note that at equilibrium with scores monotonic in types, we must have i ( c; c) = 0 for both = 0 and = 1. For both cases, the least e¢ cient type c never wins and never incurs cost to produce. Note we must have q( c) = 0 for = 1.
Using the envelope condition of (13), we have
By the de…nition of i (c i ; c i ), we have
which leads to price rule of
Implication of the second observation
Suppose (q(c i ); p(c i )) is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. By the implications of the …rst observation, we must have q 0 (c i ) < 0 (monotone allocation rule is implied by incentive compatibility condition) and (15) holds. De…ne s(c i ) = s(q(c i ); p(c i )):
We now look at the implications of the second observation, which says that equilibrium (q(c i ); p(c i )) must solve the following optimization problem:
(q(c i ); p(c i )) = arg max We thus have & 0 (q(c i )) = s q (q(c i ); p(c i )) s p (q(c i ); p(c i ))
where p(c i ) is given by (15).
Together with boundary condition q( c) = 0, we can pin down the candidate quality bid q(c i ). If there is no solution exists, then there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
Suppose q(c i ) is a solution of (17) with boundary condition q( c) = 0, and p(c i ) is the corresponding price bid given by (15). If the corresponding score bid s(c i ) = s(q(c i ); p(c i )) is decreasing in types, then we have (q(c i ); p(c i )) constitutes a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Otherwise, there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium.
An application to the ratio score
As an application, we next show that with the ratio form score function s = s(q; p) = q p , there might be no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium for the case of an all-pay quality bid, i.e. = 1. The equilibrium analysis in this application applies to a score function of s = s(q; p) = q p with , > 0. Taking derivative wrt. c i both sides, we have q(c i )& 0 (q(c i )) + c i q(c i )& 00 (q(c i ))q 0 (c i ) = 0:
with boundary condition q( c) = 0.
Assume &(q) = q ; > 1. We have
We thus have To con…rm such identi…ed (q(c i ); p(c i )) is indeed an equilibrium, we now only need to verify that s(c i ) = s(q(c i ); p(c i )) = q(ci) p(ci) is decreasing in types. Using (18) and (15) for = 1, we have
which means s 0 (c i ) < 0.
An interesting observation is that with the ratio score, regardless of the number of players, all type distributions with the same support [c; c] yield the same equilibrium quality bidding strategies q(c i ), c i 2 [c; c].
